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1 Introduction 
Competitiveness has become a central preoccupation of public policy. While always a 
primary focus of the private sector, in recent decades and with increasing globalisation, 
governments and the broader society have also been engaged. Indeed, some governments 
have stated that competitiveness is their highest priority. 
Environmental authorities, such as Environment Canada (Canada’s Federal 
Environment Ministry) are regularly challenged to defend their policies and regulations 
in terms of how they impose additional costs on business and affect economic 
competitiveness. These challenges typically arise from segments of the business 
community, other government departments, other levels of government and researchers 
and commentators on these issues.  
Fundamentally, the authors have been convinced of the need for a more critical look 
at competitiveness. Currently, competitiveness often receives greater priority than it 
deserves: many seem to believe that if a policy might reduce the competitiveness of a 
sector of the economy, then this is serious grounds for revising or even dropping the 
policy. Such conclusions are often premature. We argue that competitiveness is a 
multifaceted and complex issue and a more subtle analysis is needed.  
This paper illustrates how competitive forces can work to our advantage or 
disadvantage, depending on the circumstances. Firstly we provide an overview of the 
nature of competitiveness and some of its key dimensions. This is then followed by a 
more formal section presenting some modified Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) models of 
firms’ and governments’ strategies (domestic and international), with respect to 
competitiveness and environmental protection. By varying assumptions about the 
distribution of industries internationally and whether pollution impacts are felt locally or 
globally, the model provides different, but plausible predictions of national behaviour. 
The next section reviews some of the empirical evidence of the impacts of environmental 
policies and regulations on competitiveness and attempts to show how the results of the 
PD model can be reconciled with current empirical results. Finally, the last section 
provides a brief summary of the paper and some suggested approaches for policy-makers 
in reconciling competitiveness with sustainable development. 
2 Competitiveness  
The pursuit of competitiveness is generally unquestioned – rarely are reasons provided as 
to why competitiveness is a good thing. In a previous paper [1], we have attempted to 
address the apparent gap in the mainstream thinking vis-à-vis competitiveness, putting 
the concepts and values behind competitiveness under scrutiny and assessing how, why, 
whether and when competitiveness should be a guiding goal. Here, we focus on the core 
economic issues with respect to competitiveness.  
In general, economic competitiveness is concerned with performance in a competitive 
market and can be considered at a number of levels: 
 for firms, competitiveness is a survival issue: their ability to stay in business depends 
on generating revenues and reasonable returns on investment which in turn depends 
on how competitive they are in setting prices, attracting customers etc.  
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 industries must also be competitive, both with other competing industries within the 
economy and more importantly, with similar industries in other regions and 
countries 
 finally, we can assess the competitiveness of geographic areas and assess the overall 
competitiveness of a region or country [2].  
A useful device for assessing competitiveness at these different levels is to use a sports 
analogy. In sports, there are a variety of actors, each with different roles and perspectives 
on competitiveness. In assessing how an economic actor responds to the issue of 
competitiveness, it is very useful to ask whether they are a player, a team, a coach, a 
referee, or a rule maker – or some combination of these. 
By and large firms tend to be the players or teams; they are competitors in the 
marketplace, but not the referees, coaches or rule-makers. They are constantly focused on 
improving their competitiveness – if the market is competitive their very survival may be 
at stake. Industries are also players or teams to the extent that they are competing with 
other industries [3].  
2.1 National governments play a multiplicity of roles with respect to ‘national 
competitiveness’  
Governments have always had a keen interest in the performance of industry: it is a 
critical component of overall and individual well-being and indeed is the source of most 
of the revenues that allow governments to perform their other key functions. With 
respect to the domestic economy, they play all roles, except that of competitor. In Canada, 
the federal government is a competitiveness coach via a variety of policies and programs, 
notably those of Industry Canada, which help to improve the competitive performance of 
Canadian firms and industries. As a referee, government agencies and the legal system 
play a key role in adjudicating disputes amongst competitors and ensuring that business 
laws are applied and enforced fairly and effectively. Indeed, property rights are at the 
heart of the market system and it is governments and the courts that shape and enforce 
these rights. 
Finally, perhaps the most important role of government is as the governing body or 
rule-maker. Government laws and policies set the domestic rules for market competition; 
ranging from the aforementioned foundation of basic property rights, to a sophisticated 
set of marketplace framework laws i.e. competition law, consumer protection laws, 
intellectual property rights, bankruptcy law, etc. Even criminal laws such as those 
pertaining to murder are part of the legal environment that frames our competitive 
market. Organised crime has proved that extortion, blackmail and even murder are 
effective tools of competition, even if these are dimensions of competition that the 
broader society seeks to constrain. 
Domestic and international considerations are central when discussing the role of 
government with respect to competitiveness. In a closed economy, countries and national 
governments are not generally competing with other countries. Competition may occur 
within the country amongst different political approaches and there will undoubtedly be 
competition amongst parties and candidates to form the government. But domestically, 
the government itself, which endures regardless of who is in power, while generally 
striving to improve its performance, is not actively competing against any adversaries. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    G. Oliver and R. Basak    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
In an open economy, things are quite different. A national government does not 
simply set the competitiveness rules for the domestic market according to its preferred 
balance amongst the market, environment, social considerations, etc. It now must meet 
the test of international markets. With increasing globalisation, domestic laws are not just 
potentially redistributing rights and resources amongst domestic players; they may also 
change the relative attractiveness of domestic goods on the international market. Now the 
national government’s policies may enhance or detract from the competitiveness of 
domestic industries in the global market. In essence, the shift from a domestic to 
international context puts national governments in the position of player, actively 
competing with other jurisdictions for economic benefits such as foreign direct 
investment, market share for domestic production, skilled knowledge workers etc. 
For example, an environmental regulation may be well thought out and achieve a 
strongly supported and reasonable balance between domestic economic, environmental 
and social priorities (i.e. represent a policy consistent with the principles of sustainable 
development). However, if an equivalent environmental regulation is not duplicated in 
other jurisdictions internationally, then there may be competitive pressures on the 
government to adjust its policies to compete with those of other nations.  
Finally we note that the government’s role as a rule-maker, which it clearly exercises 
domestically, is severely constrained internationally. A national government can no 
longer set the rules governing an increasing share of economic activity, which occurs in 
world markets. So we see that with the shift from a domestic context to an international 
setting, national governments must:  
1 adopt a new role, as active players in competition with other countries 
2 cope with a reduced role as governing bodies and rule-makers. 
In the next section, we develop a series of models to analyse the competitiveness impacts 
of environmental protection that illustrate many of these issues. 
3 The polluters dilemma: a game theory approach to competitiveness and 
environmental protection 
To illustrate the various competitiveness and environmental protection dynamics 
involved at various levels in the economy, we present various PD payoff matrices. 
Firstly, we note some limiting assumptions. These payoff matrices illustrate single-round 
PD games: in this context there is little or no trust, nor opportunity for co-operation 
between the players. Given the opportunity, time and resources, players might find ways 
to ensure a co-operative result, which would resolve the dilemma (e.g. trusted third-party 
intervention can resolve the issue). Also, extending the game beyond a single round 
changes the dynamics; once the players know they will have repeated interaction with 
each other, reputation, retaliation and enforcement enter the picture. There is an involved 
literature on repeated PD games, which show that co-operation can be promoted, 
particularly in an evolutionary context (see [4]). We also need to assume that no 
consideration of social welfare influences the player’s decision; no player cares about 
how the other player or the collectivity fares. These are contestable assumptions 
empirically. 
One of the main themes we wish to emphasise is that competitive dynamics can 
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generate both positive and negative results. The rest of this section is divided into two 
main parts. The first is a short discussion of green dynamics where competitive forces 
within an economy can foster socially optimal behaviour. In particular, we use the case 
of increasing demand by consumers to illustrate how standard competitive forces in a 
market can be modelled using PD analysis. This lays the groundwork, notation and basic 
concepts for a longer discussion of dissipative or harmful competition. The second part 
examines international competition with respect to environmental standards and policies, 
using the PD models to examine different scenarios.  
3.1 Domestic analysis – green dynamics and firm-level competitiveness  
If a market is governed by well-structured framework laws that fully internalise key costs 
and benefits, then economic theory suggests that competition at the firm-level will 
generate optimal outcomes. Output levels will be efficient, in that the costs of production 
are properly balanced with the desires of consumers and this will tend to maximise the 
benefits for society. Now much of environmental economics is dedicated to illustrating 
that this is not the case and that interventions are needed to remove externalities and 
distortions that prevent this optimum from being achieved. We will not discuss this 
extensive area of knowledge and research – instead, we will look at the other side of the 
issue, where market factors help competition push firms to improve environmental 
performance. Our intent is not a fulsome discussion, but rather to use this area to 
illustrate the potential for a PD analysis to account for positive competitive outcomes. 
Green dynamics, where market factors and developments induce better firm 
performance can be classified into three main areas:  
 eco-efficiency 
 innovation and the Porter hypothesis 
 green demand  
There has been a great deal written about all three areas, but we will look more closely at 
green demand, to introduce the PD model and make some preliminary observations. 
3.1.1 Green demand 
We begin by explaining notation and outlining some basic assumptions that are 
embodied in Table 1. The arbitrary but illustrative numbers introduced here will be used 
throughout the document. We have two identical profit-maximising firms (A and B), in a 
closed market economy. If a firm chooses to produce without any pollution controls, it 
will generate a net benefit for itself of five units, but the pollution will impose a cost on 
society of -3. If it chooses to use more costly pollution reducing technology, it will gain 
only four units of benefit, but impose no pollution costs on society.  
Table 1 
  Firm B 
  D (dirty) C (clean) 
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Firm A D (dirty) (5,5) 
 
 
 
TPB = 10 
SC = -6 
NSB = 4 
(5,4) 
 
(0, 8) 
TPB = 9  8 
SC = -3  0 
NSB = 6  8 
 C (clean) (4,5) 
 
(8,0) 
TPB = 9  8 
SC = -3  0 
NSB = 6  8 
(4,4) 
 
 
 
TPB = 8 
SC = 0 
NSB = 8 
In the Table, if player A chooses D (to defect, or choose the dirty technology), this 
designates a payoff along the top row of the Table; conversely, choosing C (to co-
operate, or use the clean technology) selects the bottom row. Similarly, B’s choice 
designates the left (D) or right (C) column. 
The ordered pair (r,c) in each box of the Table identifies the payoffs to the players, 
following the ‘Roman-Catholic’ convention, where the first number is the Row payoff to 
player A and the second number is the Column payoff to player B. A particular payoff 
can be designated as ACD, which designates the payoff to player A in the bottom right, or 
CD box. In each box is the ordered pair with individual firm payoffs and underneath is 
TPB, which sums the total private benefits to the firms. 
So far, this is fairly standard notation for PD matrices. We have added some 
additional features: 
 There is also SC = Social Cost and NSB = Net Social Benefit (TPB –SC) 
 We have used arrows to show shifts in payoffs, costs and benefits which reflect the 
outcome of competitive forces. Thus, some quadrants will have two sets of payoffs 
and figures, representing outcomes before and after competitive forces have played 
out. 
In Table 1, firms can choose to produce their goods and impose a pollution externality, or 
to use more costly, cleaner technologies that eliminate the pollution. Without market 
pressure from green consumers, the strategy for each player in this case is 
straightforward. D, using dirty technology (D) is the obvious choice, given that there are 
never higher benefits to the firm from the clean choice (C). [5] (This represents the first 
ordered pair in the table quadrants, on the tail end of the arrow).  
Without assuming green demand, from the perspective of the players, this is not a 
PD. The firm payoff of using the dirty technology is higher for both players than it is to 
use clean technology. It is only the social cost, the externality that both firms produce, 
that makes it preferable for both firms to co-operate (or be forced) to use clean 
technology. Remember that in this model, the firms are assumed not to care about social 
costs and benefits unless they directly impinge on their own welfare. This failure of firms 
to internalise the pollution impacts of their activity provides a classic rationale for 
government intervention, via regulations and other policies to require firms to use clean 
technology and maximise social welfare. However, it is possible that market factors such 
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as green demand could achieve the same result. 
Green demand or consumption represents a demand side shift, a shift in consumer 
preference for products that are better for the environment. Products will be assessed on 
the environmental impact of the product itself, as well as the impact of the processes 
surrounding its production, use and disposal. Green consumption flips the 
competitiveness dynamic. Clean production, which was previously only seen as an 
additional production cost is now a feature of the product that provides value to 
consumers [6]. In Table 1, the competitive outcomes and associated payoffs (at the 
pointed end of the arrows) reflect the complete domination of green demand and 
consumers do not buy from firms using dirty production. This table is now a PD for the 
firms, in that if they could collude to avoid implementing costly pollution control devices 
and deny consumers green goods, they would. However, the PD dynamic forces the shift 
to the lower quadrant payoff (CC = 4.4 versus DD = (5.5)), which works to the greater 
social good. Under extreme assumptions, where all consumers are ultra-green, the clean 
firm drives the dirty firms out of business and captures all the demand. Facing such 
competitive pressures, the dirty firm would be forced to go clean as well. In short, market 
competition will force producers to meet consumer demands. If green demand is 
sufficiently strong, then government intervention may be less warranted. Green demand 
will engage market forces and force firms to improve their environmental performance. 
Of course, this result is not really surprising. In essence, competitive markets force all 
firms into a PD, one that lowers firm returns but maximises social good. Standard 
economic analysis clearly shows that if firms collude and form a cartel, they will be able 
to exact higher prices, be less responsive to demand pressures and reap higher returns 
than they would under competitive conditions. Competition forces firms to be responsive 
– if there is a demand for green goods, competitive markets will deliver them. See [7] or 
other industrial organisation texts for an overview of this argument. In general, properly 
functioning markets create PD and competition with a positive overall outcome for 
society. 
However this result is not assured with respect to producer environmental behaviour. 
Being a green consumer is not easy. Unless eco-efficiency gains allow the green product 
to be priced lower than alternatives, the consumer will have to pay more for the green 
product; this is a classic quality-price trade-off. Information costs for green consumers 
can also be significant. The research and science on environmental impacts is evolving, 
complex and not always accessible. It can be extremely difficult and time-consuming to 
gather and assess environmental information on products. While price information is 
usually readily accessible, determining the quality of a product is often more difficult. If 
the quality in question does not relate to the physical properties of the product, but its 
environmental impact in production, use and disposal/recycling, the information is often 
not directly available by examination. Finally, consumers may face difficulties and high 
transactions costs in acting together. Individuals may not wish to pay more for 
environmentally better products, if they are not convinced others will join them. If they 
act alone, they will pay more and yet see little gain for the environment. 
Given these considerations, it is by no means clear that green demand would be an 
adequate mechanism for internalising the costs of the environmental damages imposed 
by dirty firms. It remains to be seen whether efforts such as eco-labelling, environmental 
performance indicators, etc. can bring green demand to significant levels.  
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3.2 International – country level analysis 
We now consider an international model, where we assume four identical countries, W, 
X, Y and Z. Each country has two firms. We assume no trans-boundary pollution, i.e. 
that pollution damages occur only within the country of production. Green dynamics are 
assumed to be inadequate to address pollution externalities. 
Under the basic assumptions discussed previously, we saw that it is in each country’s 
domestic interest to develop policies that force firms to use clean technology. However, 
the international context adds a new dynamic. In Table 2 we model a payoff matrix 
focusing on country W and for the moment assume that countries X, Y and Z act together 
to take uniform decisions. We will also assume full capital mobility, in that firms can 
choose to relocate to countries when it is in their interest to do so [8]. 
Table 2 All countries are identical   
  Countries X, Y and Z collectively 
  D (dirty) C (clean) 
County W D (dirty) (4,12) 
 
 
 
NSB=16 
(4,24) 
 
(16, 0) 
NSB = 28  16 
 C (clean) (8,12) 
 
(0,16) 
NSB = 20  16 
(8,24) 
 
 
 
NSB=32 
      Note: Pollution effects are local 
Now the payoff to a country for each clean firm is four representing the lower return 
(four instead of five) to the firm, but no pollution costs are imposed on society. Each 
country has two firms and so under clean technology, each country has a total benefit of 
eight. In the table, box CC, where all countries have enforced policies against pollution, 
the payoffs are WCC = 8 and [X,Y,Z]CC = 24; 8 for each of the three countries X, Y and 
Z.  
Each dirty firm provides a net benefit to a country of two, representing a higher 
return of five to each firm, but also an imposed pollution cost of -3. Box DD has payoffs 
where each country gets a return of 4; 2 from each of the two domestic firms. 
Let us examine the dynamics of Table 2 more closely. Beginning in CC, we see that 
this box has the highest net social benefit. Looking at country W’s choice, we see that if 
they change their rules and allow their firms to be dirty (shift to DC), then, initially at 
least, this will not be to their advantage. They will incur the costs of greater pollution 
within their country and reduce their benefits from eight to four. 
However, a new dynamic occurs. Country W now allows firms to use dirty 
technology, which gives firms a higher return of five, as opposed to four with clean 
technology. Country W has set itself up as a pollution haven. Based on this higher return 
and assuming no other costs as well as frictionless capital mobility, firms will shift their 
operations from countries X, Y and Z and move to Country W. A new dynamic is being 
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introduced, that of inter-country competition for capital and investment, based on 
environmental standards and relative returns to firms. Under the extreme case, Country 
W attracts all the firms and gains a return of 16, which is much better than the original 
eight it received under WCC. Other countries are left bereft and lose all their industries 
and the associated benefits. However, net social benefits have been reduced 
considerably, dropping from 32 to 16.  
Of course, countries X, Y and Z do not sit by idly, watching their domestic industries 
fly to offshore pollution havens. They will match the lower standards of W and retain 
their industries. This is represented by the shift from DC to DD, where eventually all 
countries are allowing their firms to pollute. This dynamic is commonly referred to as the 
race to the bottom. Box CD illustrates that if country W tries to clean up its act alone, it 
will be initially better off, but the international competition from other jurisdictions will 
cause its domestic industries to leave and leave it with a lower return. Thus, under these 
dynamics, countries will be penalised for having higher environmental standards than the 
international norm, even if both a domestic and a global benefit-cost analysis shows the 
higher standards are fully warranted [9]. Again, we note that as the dynamic plays itself 
out in boxes DD and CD, the net social benefit is reduced to 16, as compared to 32 when 
everyone insists on clean production by firms. 
An obvious resolution to this dilemma is to invoke an external authority, such as an 
enforced international agreement, that will bind countries to implement effective policies 
for clean production. 
3.2.1 Dissipative vs positive competition 
In this example, countries are trapped in a race to the bottom, an example of dissipative 
competition. Countries are competing for capital and investment and while it is always 
better to win than lose in a competition, ultimately the competition itself reduces net 
social benefit. In general, dissipative competition occurs when the gains from the 
competition are less than the losses [10]. Gains and losses can be usefully categorised as: 
general social gains and losses, reflecting a positive or negative externality imposed by 
the decisions of the players in the competition; or, actual gains and losses to the players 
in question. It is the interplay between individual gains and losses to players and the 
broader externalities to society, the social gains and losses, which will determine whether 
any given competition generates higher or lower net social welfare. Whether competition 
will be positive for the players and society in general cannot be determined a priori – 
each case needs to be examined individually. The policy should be tailored to ensure that 
the rules and competitive environment are structured so as to maximise net social 
welfare. 
In this case (Table 2), the countries themselves are made worse off in the equilibrium 
competitive result, DD, than they would be if they were forced to co-operate. However, 
we saw in the previous discussion on green dynamics, that competition can be dissipative 
for the players, but generate a greater positive social externality. Firms incurred greater 
costs to produce green products, but consumers and society benefited by the competition 
to meet green demand. 
In the current example, it has been suggested that an international agreement could be 
used to avoid countries gaining competitive advantage by lowering environmental 
standards to attract a disproportionate share of investment. Other solutions may also be 
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possible. For example, trade measures that would allow for discriminating against 
production and process methods have been a long-standing area of discussion in the trade 
and environment literature [11]. The green dynamics discussed above can also apply 
here. If eco-efficiency, green demand or longer term strategies shift incentives for firms 
sufficiently, then this can also change the dynamic [12]. Pollution havens may not be 
attractive if they represent a less competitive option for firms catering to a changing, 
greener international market. Of course, green dynamics, while providing positive 
signals, have yet to be proven adequate in shifting firm and country behaviour to the 
degree required by many of the current environmental challenges we face. 
3.2.2 Timing and market share 
The dynamic in Table 2 will shift if the distribution of firms is skewed. Consider  
what happens if one country dominates the industry in question (Table 3). We now let 
country W have ten firms, while the rest of the Countries still have two firms. Now 
country W has no incentive to shift from a clean world CC, to try dirty production; 
because of their greater share of industry, they would receive a proportionate (larger) 
share of the pollution. As before, they have no immediate incentive to reduce 
environmental standards, because this would reduce their payoffs from 40 to 20. Unlike 
before, they are still not better off if they attract foreign investment to their country. The 
payoff from more dirty firms (12 more added to 20) still does not bring them back to 
where they were (final payoff after attracting foreign investment is still only 32, 
compared with 40). So the dominant country will initially have no incentive to reduce its 
standards, even if it attracts foreign investment. 
However, the pressures for a race to the bottom are not completely eliminated. 
Countries X, Y and Z can gain by lowering standards and attracting investment from W 
to their pollution havens. In box CD, we see that while these countries initially incur 
greater pollution and reduced welfare (shift from 24 to 12 in total) eventually competitive 
forces attract more firms from W. As investment drains from W, the race to the bottom 
will reassert itself and country W will feel competitive pressures to reduce their 
standards. Thus, in this example, the dynamic is slower and lopsided, but eventually 
country W is driven to reduce its environmental standards. The obvious interpretation of 
these results is to equate county W with the developed world and countries X, Y and Z 
with the developing world. As will be discussed later, there are many reasons to resist 
quick assessments with respect to pollution havens and the race to the bottom. 
Nevertheless, this model does suggest that these dynamics are not occurring largely 
because of the lopsided distribution of industry and economic activity between regions. 
Table 3 One country dominates economically  
 Countries X, Y and Z collectively  
(each country still has 2 firms) 
 D (dirty) C (clean) 
County W  
(has ten firms) 
D (dirty) (20,12) 
 
 
 
NSB=32 
(20,24) 
 
(32, 0) 
NSB = 44  32 
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 C (clean) (40,12) 
 
(0,32) 
NSB = 52  32 
(40,24) 
 
 
 
NSB=64 
      Note: Pollution effects are local 
3.2.3 Sensitivity to social costs: size and distribution 
Our example of four identical countries being trapped in a PD combining a pollution 
haven and a race to the bottom (Table 2) is sensitive to several assumptions. The overall 
benefit of a polluting firm must be positive, or else there is no gain from attracting such 
firms to your country. We assumed that dirty firms produced a net direct benefit of five 
and a social cost of -3, yielding a net social benefit per dirty firm of two. If the social 
costs were worse than -5, these would negate all the benefits each firm generated and 
there would be no incentive to creating a pollution haven. Each additional firm not only 
provides no benefit but will ‘overall’ be harmful to the country it operates in. If the costs 
of clean technology remains one, then all countries will force firms to use clean 
technology and there will be no PD, no pollution havens and no race to the bottom [13]. 
Our final Tables examine the case where the costs of pollution are not borne locally, 
but instead are shared globally. This would correspond to the climate change case, where 
CO2 emissions have no significant local effects, but are a major global greenhouse gas. 
In Tables 4 and 5, we assume that the countries are identical in terms of their 
susceptibility to global pollution and will always bear one quarter of the total social cost, 
regardless of their individual responsibility. Social costs are still -3 per firm. We will 
now contrast Table 2 with Table 4 and Table 3 with Table 5, respectively, to highlight 
the dynamic changes when negative effects of pollution are no longer only felt locally, 
but can be shared with other countries.  
Firstly, we note some general features. Tables 4 and 5 have an explicit reference to 
social costs and more importantly social costs imposed per country, because this figure 
may now be independent of the decisions of the individual countries affected (i.e. a 
country that has no polluting industries can now be affected by offshore pollution). We 
also see that the net social benefit in each box has not changed, but the distribution of 
these benefits has shifted radically. Finally we see a new feature, negative returns to 
countries. Previously, the worse case scenario was to lose all your industry to the 
pollution havens (benefits = 0): now, you can lose all your industry for 0 benefits, but 
incur pollution costs from those very firms operating in other countries! 
Table 4 All countries are identical  
  Countries X, Y and Z collectively 
  D (dirty) C (clean) 
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County W D (dirty) (4,12) 
 
 
SC = -16 
SC/country = -4 
 
 
NSB=16 
(8.5, 19.5) 
 
(34, -18) 
SC = -6  -24 
SC/country = 
-1.5  - 6 
NSB = 28  16 
 C (clean) (3.5,16.5) 
 
(-6, 22) 
SC = -18  -24 
SC/country = 
-4.5  -6 
NSB = 20  16 
(8,24) 
 
 
SC = 0 
SC/country = 0 
 
 
NSB=32 
      Note: Local pollution shared globally 
Table 5 One country dominates economically 
  
 
Countries X, Y and Z collectively 
(each country still has 2 firms) 
  D (dirty) C (clean) 
County W 
(has ten firms) 
D (dirty) (38,-6) 
 
 
SC = -48 
SC/country = 
-12 
 
NSB = 32 
(42.5, 1.5) 
 
(68, -36) 
SC = -30  -48 
SC/country = 
-7.5  -12 
NSB = 44  32 
 C (clean) (35.5,16.5) 
 
(-12, 44) 
SC = -18  -48 
SC/country = 
-4.5  -12 
NSB = 52  32 
(40,24) 
 
 
SC = 0 
SC/country = 0 
 
 
NSB = 64 
      Note: Local pollution shared globally 
Let us now look closely at the difference between Tables 2 and 4. Recall that we are 
talking about four identical countries. The main difference is that the incentive to defect 
(allow dirty firms to operate) is significantly increased. In Table 2, countries took an 
immediate reduction in benefits if they reduced their standard from the international 
norm and it was only as they attracted a disproportionate share of international 
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investment to their pollution haven that this strategy proved attractive. In Table 4, there is 
no delay. Dirty firms generate higher returns and they export a share of their pollution 
abroad. In the table, country W immediately improves its situation as benefits shift from 
8 to 8.5. Competitive forces exacerbate this. When W attracts all the firms from other 
countries, their benefits increase to 44 and the rest of the world is forced to endure part of 
the impacts of their pollution, imposing a net negative cost of -18 (-6 for each of 
countries X, Y and Z). The temptation payoffs are increased, the sucker costs are worse 
and the force of the PD increased accordingly. However, the final payoffs and social 
benefits in box DD are not any different between the two matrices – eventually all 
countries race to the bottom and all firms are polluting and, because all countries are 
identical, each shares the same overall reduction in welfare.  
Contrasting Table 3 with Table 5 shows some very dramatic results. In analysing 
Table 3, we noted that the dominant country W, with its ten industries, did not have any 
immediate incentive to reduce its standards, as it would feel the effects of a large amount 
of pollution right away. Even attracting the last share of foreign investment did not make 
them better off than with a smaller, but clean industry. Only as a significant number of 
their domestic firms moved to pollution havens would they want to lower standards to 
retain investment. In Table 5, country W can export the pollution and it has an immediate 
and strong incentive to allow pollution. W only faces one quarter of the pollution costs 
generated by its domestic industry, but retains all its firms, so W’s benefits can increase 
immediately from 40 to 42.5. This could further increase up to 68, if Country W can 
attract firms from all the other countries. 
In Table 3, dominant country W has an initial incentive to go from box DD to CD 
and gain the benefits of cleaning up its large number of dirty domestic firms. It is only 
the threat of competition and the shift of its firms to pollution havens, that keep it from 
going clean alone. However, in Table 5, Country W has no incentive whatsoever to clean 
up its industries, because it can export most of its pollution to the other countries. In 
Table 3, competition is needed to generate a PD and the race to the bottom. In Table 5, 
the ability to externalise the costs is sufficient to generate the PD; competition only 
exacerbates the problem. 
The most telling dynamic in Table 5, however, is that the dilemma for Country W is 
very weak. The final equilibrium payoff is only slightly less than occurs under the co-
operative outcome (WDD = 38 versus WCC = 40). With a slightly higher concentration of 
the global industry, or with slightly different cost or damage assumptions, W could 
export even more pollution and may have no interest in any binding international 
agreement to impose clean technology. The co-operative outcome is not just unstable, as 
it is in any PD structure, but is actually a worse outcome for W than when everyone 
pollutes. The rest of the world would have to buy W off to induce any agreement to 
change! 
Finally, if the pollution is shared globally, but the economic benefits accrue locally, 
then we might see countries allowing firms to pollute, even though at the broader level, 
the pollution would completely negate the value of the economic activity. In the 
discussion of the local case (Table 2) we noted that if social costs per firm were worse 
than -5, then no country would fail to regulate and no pollution haven or race to the 
bottom would occur. However, when the pollution costs are exported, even activities that 
have negative overall value may be encouraged within a jurisdiction. Everyone is worse 
off, but no country will take positive action alone, because unilateral action will make a 
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country worse off. 
3.3 Summary of game theory results 
This section has shown that payoff matrices can be very useful for modelling strategic 
behaviour relating to environmental protection and competitiveness. The examples in the 
payoff matrices above have highlighted how strategies relating to environmental 
protection and competitiveness are sensitive to a variety of assumptions. Those examined 
included different numerical assumptions with respect to costs and benefits for firm and 
society, the distribution of economic activity, whether pollution is local or global and 
whether environmental values are internalised by consumers in their purchase decisions. 
In many cases, competitive market forces were critical in driving the outcome: in some 
cases, such as green demand, the competition was positive and generated higher welfare; 
in others, the competition was dissipative, providing incentives to create pollution havens 
and fuel a race to the bottom. These latter cases suggested a role for rules and 
international agreements to curtail such competition. The final analyses illustrated how 
regions with a disproportionate share of economic activity might be leaders in curtailing 
pollution which has a local impact, but not support environmental measures to address 
pollution whose impact is mainly global. 
While such theoretical examinations can be helpful, they cannot be relied upon 
exclusively. We need to contrast the insights from such analysis with empirical results. 
To begin with, we will need baseline information to determine which of the various 
assumptions examined here to invoke when looking for a more specific framework of 
analysis. Indeed, as the next section will show, many of the data uncovered to date do not 
support the conclusions suggested by the models above.  
4 Links to literature and empirical results 
In this section we highlight key results from some of the literature and where fruitful, 
explore links to the results from the previous section of this paper. 
The great majority of studies we have reviewed, conclude that: 
 by and large, the overall scale of environmental costs (absolutely and with respect  
to other factors) is not large enough to affect the competitiveness of firms [14–19] 
 environmental protection measures are not generating competitive disadvantages 
with respect to economic growth [20,21], productivity [22–24,20,25], investment 
decisions [26–29], employment [30–34], trade flows [31,35,24,28,33,36–38] and 
profitability [33].  
Nations with the most stringent environmental standards show the best economic 
performance. Michael Porter [39,40] goes even further, arguing that among other things 
governments can support competitiveness and innovation through ‘strong environmental 
protection.’ 
However, we argue that governments must still take seriously all plausible claims that 
environmental policies and measures are having, or could have, a significant, negative 
impact on competitiveness. Firstly, even if such claims appear to be without empirical 
support, they are invoked regularly in discussions regarding environmental policies. 
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Secondly, it is not clear that these empirical results will hold if the cost of environmental 
policies imposed on industries continues to increase – notably the long-term, post Kyoto 
impacts of climate change mitigation policies. If significant impacts are discovered, 
governments must investigate further – the response must be based on a full 
understanding of the source of the competitiveness disadvantage.  
In those instances where policies may be affecting industry in a very real way, we 
need to examine whether: 
 our environmental standards deviated significantly from those of competitors  
 we can influence the external economic environment to level the playing field 
 competitiveness impacts have been assessed using a static or dynamic approach  
– does the result consider how markets, technology and tastes are evolving? 
 other factors that influence competitiveness are actually driving this result (e.g. 
relative wages, exchange rates, shifts in the business cycle, etc.) 
 we have used the optimal mix of policy instruments to achieve the environmental 
target 
 the loss of competitiveness is really the market responding to better economic 
signals and overall represents a positive adjustment 
 we have clearly understood the strategic dimensions of this issue and determined 
whether competitive forces are working to generate higher social welfare, or are 
fuelling dissipative competition and a race to the bottom. 
Until we can answer these questions we cannot determine how to respond to a reported 
loss in competitiveness resulting from an environmental policy. But we also need to keep 
in mind that competitiveness is only one element in a panoply of considerations when 
developing environmental policies. 
5 Conclusions 
We have discussed the various facets of competition and competitiveness and the 
interface between environmental protection and competitiveness. A PD model with five 
payoff matrices, each with different competitiveness and environmental scenarios, was 
developed to analyse the complex issues involved in this area and the strategic behaviour 
of both firms and nations. 
The section on PD models highlighted how strategies are sensitive to a variety of 
assumptions and how, in many cases, competition was critical in driving the outcome. In 
some cases, such as green demand, the competition was positive and generated higher 
welfare, while in others, the competition was dissipative, providing incentives to create 
pollution havens and fuel a race to the bottom. This reminds us that governments provide 
the framework for effective functioning of markets and the use of competition as a tool to 
improve performance and the overall welfare of a nation’s citizens. It also reinforces the 
argument in support of international rules and agreements to curtail the perverse effects 
of dissipative competition. Framework rules must promote economic activity that 
improves social welfare and must establish rules that promote positive behaviour vis-à-
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vis the environment and other core values of citizens.  
We have also tried to link our analysis and models to some of the key results in the 
empirical literature. While we do not contradict the general consensus that environmental 
measures rarely reduce competitiveness, we do show that these results may be less robust 
than assumed and that there remains some unanswered questions. The logic of the 
models presented is intuitive and often compelling. As we take on more complex 
environmental problems that incur more significant costs, we suggest that many of the 
strategic behaviours described in this section could emerge. 
Economic competitiveness and competition are, from the perspective of a sovereign 
government, tools for achieving a goal, not goals in themselves. For a sovereign 
government, competition and competitiveness are tools to help improve economic 
performance and provide a better quality of life for its citizens. The same logic applies 
globally. If globalisation erodes national sovereignty and domestic ability to set critical 
marketplace rules, then we would want international agreements and institutions to adopt 
a similar, instrumental view, on the role of competitiveness and competition.  
Sustainable development provides underlying principles for the development of 
public policies. It suggests a broad inclusive approach to considering issues, rather than a 
narrow technology assessment confined to a particular discipline. We believe that this is 
the most fruitful way to examine the interplay of economic competitiveness and 
environmental protection. 
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